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A denial of Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) 
will be upheld if it the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
is supported by "substantial evidence." In practice, the application of 
the substantial evidence standard has varied as the Seventh Circuit has 
struggled over the degree of deference that should be accorded to the 
ALJ's findings. This is particularly true in cases that require the 
administrative law judge to evaluate impairments with highly 
subjective effects, as well impairments that must be considered in 
combination to determine disability.1 The Seventh Circuit's recent 
decision in Gentle v. Barnhart advances a vision of the substantial 
evidence standard informed by the broad objectives of the Social 
Security's disability program, an approach that emphasizes the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2006, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. I would like to thank Professor Hal Morris, John G. New, Devin 
McComb, and Stacy Manning for their assistance with this note. 
1 See e.g., Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2004) (subjective 
experience of pain); Sims v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 2002) (combined effect 
of multiple impairments, none of which rise individually to the level of disability). 
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investigatory burden on the ALJ over deference to the ALJ in her 
adjudicatory role.2 
First this note will provide an overview of how the Social Security 
Administration evaluates disability claims and how claimants can 
appeal an adverse decision. Next this note will survey the debate 
within the Seventh Circuit over the application of the substantial 
evidence standard in social security disability law and the level of 
deference accorded to factual findings by the ALJ.3 This will be 
followed by a discussion of how the Seventh Circuit's most recent 
decision in Gentle v. Barnhart extends the line of reasoning that more 
vigorously questions whether an adverse decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. In this decision, the Seventh Circuit placed a 
heavy emphasis on the investigatory responsibilities of the 
administrative law judge. This approach gives slightly less deference 
to factual findings by the ALJ where coming to those conclusions 
requires a subjective evaluation, for example, evaluating the credibility 
of the witness. Finally, this note will conclude that although this 
approach slightly weakens deference to the adjudicatory role of the 
ALJ in favor of a somewhat heavier burden the ALJs in her 
investigatory role, this approach is consistent with the language and 




Applying for Social Security Disability benefits can be a complex 
process, particularly if the applicant's claim is rejected initially. A 
person insured by Social Security who becomes disabled may apply 
for disability insurance benefits (DIB) after a waiting period of five 
months following the onset of the disability.4 The prospective 
applicant then has a one year window in which to file a claim with the 
                                                 
2 430 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2005). 
3 The cases selected for discussion have been chosen because they illustrate the 
debate through the contrasting reasoning offered in the majority and dissenting 
opinions. This is not intended as an exhaustive survey of cases in which the Seventh 
Circuit has applied the substantial evidence standard. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(2) (2004). 
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Social Security Administration (SSA).5 To be considered disabled, a 
person must be unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . 
. ."6 The applicant must be unable to continue their "previous work" or 
"engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 
the national economy" where jobs that the claimant can perform exist 
in significant numbers in the regional economy.7 The disability must 
be "medically determinable."8 It also must be relatively permanent: to 
qualify as a disability, it must be expected either to result in death or to 
last for a continuous period of at least one year.9  
Disability is evaluated using a five-step evaluation process.10 If a 
claimant is found to be  disabled or not to be disabled at any step, the 
analysis ends.11 First, the SSA examiner or ALJ asks whether an 
applicant is involved in substantial gainful activity; if so, that person 
will not be considered disabled.12 There are exceptions to the rule. 
Make-work provided by an indulgent employer is not considered 
gainful activity because such employment is not proof of 
employability.13 Neither is employment taken out of desperation.14  
The second step is to consider whether any medically 
determinable physical or mental impairments, individually or in 
combination, meet the duration requirement for severity.15 To be 
considered disabled, the disability must be expected to persist for at 
                                                 
5 42 U.S.C. § 423(b) (2004). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2004). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (2004). 
10 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2006) (explaining five-step sequential evaluation 
process). 
11 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2006). 
12 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). (2006) 
13 Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1998). 
14 Id. 
15 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2006). 
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least one year.16 Qualitative severity is evaluated in the third step.17 If 
any impairment meets or equals the severity of one of the impairments 
listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, the claimant will be 
considered disabled.18  
If the claimant is not considered disabled at step three, the SSA 
will make a determination of the claimant's residual functional 
capacity for use in steps four and five.19 Residual functional capacity 
is the most work a claimant can do within the claimant's limitations.20 
It is determined through an assessment of the claimant's physical 
abilities, mental abilities, environmental restrictions and the total 
limiting effect of all impairments and symptoms.21 The fourth step 
considers whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work 
given her residual functional capacity.22 If the claimant can perform 
her past relevant work despite her limitations, she will not be 
considered disabled.23 
Finally, in the fifth step, the examiner or ALJ determines whether 
the claimant is able to make an adjustment to other work24 based on 
residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.25 20 
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 lists medical-vocational guidelines 
("grids") that may be used to assess whether a claimant should be 
considered capable of substantial gainful employment for purposes of 
social security disability benefits based on physical abilities, age and 
education. For example, under Table No. 1, illiteracy, advanced age, 
and a work history of unskilled work would together direct a finding 
                                                 
16 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (2006) (incorporating by reference duration 
requirements in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509) (2006). 
17 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (2006). 
18 Id. 
19 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2006). 
20 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (2006).  
21 Id. 
22 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) (2006). 
23 Id. 
24 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (2006). 
25 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1) (2006). 
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of disability, presuming the claimant's limitations prevent her from 
performing her past relevant work.26 Alternatively, or where the grids 
do not apply because a mental residual functional capacity must be 
considered, a vocational expert may be called to testify to how many 
jobs are available in the regional economy that can be performed by 
the claimant, taking the claimant's limitations into account.27 
 
A. Review of the Initial Determination 
 
If the Social Security Administration determines that a claimant is 
not disabled, the claimant may challenge that determination through an 
administrative review process.28 First, the claimant may ask for 
reconsideration.29 If the claim is denied upon reconsideration, the 
claimant has the right to a hearing before an ALJ.30 The ALJ is 
responsible for a unique type of administrative review. The 
administrative review hearing is a non-adversarial process.31 Although 
the claimant has a right to be represented by counsel,32 the 
Commissioner of Social Security is unrepresented at the hearing.33 
The ALJ has an investigatory role as well as a quasi-judicial role. 
While the claimant has the opportunity to offer evidence of disability 
by submitting medical records and testimony,34 the ALJ has a duty to 
investigate facts and develop the issues through the course of the 
hearing.35 The ALJ has multiple tools for developing the record. The 
ALJ reviews records and hears testimony from witnesses, including 
                                                 
26 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1(2006). 
27 69 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1 § 66 (2005). 
28 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (2006). 
29 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)(2) (2006). 
30 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b)(3) (2006). 
31 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (2006). 
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (2000). 
33 Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11 (2000). 
34 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.935, 404.949, 404.950 (2006). 
35 Sims, 530 U.S. at 111 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400-401 
(1971)). 
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medical experts, friends and family of the claimant, and the claimant 
himself.36 The examiner has great latitude to conduct the hearing in a 
relatively informal manner, considering even evidence that might be 
excluded as hearsay in a more formal judicial proceeding.37 Where 
additional evidence is required, the ALJ has the discretion to order 
additional medical and psychiatric examinations.38 A medical advisor 
may be called upon to review the medical records and offer her 
professional opinion.39  
If the ALJ denies the applicant's claim, the applicant may appeal 
to the Social Security Appeals Council.40 If the claimant is not 
satisfied with the Council's decision, the claimant may seek 
administrative review in federal court.41 
The ALJ's determination of whether a claimant is disabled, and 
ultimately the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, must 
be supported by "substantial evidence."42 Reviewing courts are to give 
the findings of the Commissioner, and in effect the ALJ, conclusive 
weight in questions of fact where those factual findings are supported 
by substantial evidence.43 That the record contains enough information 
to support an ALJ's decision is not sufficient: the ALJ has an 
obligation to write a detailed explanation the decision, one that 
"build[s] an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [the] 
                                                 
36 See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 ("The hearing 
examiner shall inquire fully into the matters at issue and shall receive into evidence 
the testimony of witnesses and any documents which are relevant and material to 
such matters  . . .”)); 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (2006). 
37 Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 ("The … procedure at the hearing generally 
. . . shall be in the discretion of the hearing examiner and of such nature as to afford 
the parties a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing.")) 
38 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519, 404.1519a (2006). 
39 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 408. 
40 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(4) (2006). 
41 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(5) (2006). 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000). 
43 Id. ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if 
supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive … .") (emphasis added). 
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conclusion."44 Courts are authorized "to enter … a judgment affirming, 
modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing."45 
However, a reviewing court may award benefits only where "all 
factual issues have been resolved and the record supports a finding of 
disability."46 
 
B. Construing "Substantial Evidence" 
 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner has 
noted a tension in the interpretation of social security disability law 
between empathy and economy, an ideological split between "those 
who empathize with the humane objectives of the law and those who 
worry about fostering dependence and depleting the federal budget."47 
He observes that these perspectives in the field are divided by 
fundamental questions of value, questions not easily resolved by 
appeals to a neutral observer.48 While Judge Posner noted this in the 
context of discussion of the wisdom of reforming the review process 
                                                 
44 Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dixon v. 
Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting reasons for a decision 
supplied by the Commissioner's lawyers rather than by the ALJ in her report). 
45 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2000). 
46 Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 2005). In Briscoe, The 
Seventh Circuit clarified the circumstances under which a reviewing court may 
award benefits rather than reversing and remanding for proceedings consistent with 
the court's decision. The confusion among the district courts arose from the Seventh 
Circuit's decision in Wilder v. Apfel. Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 356 (citing Wilder v. 
Apfel, 153 F.3d 799, 801 (7th Cir. 1998)). In Wilder, the Seventh Circuit awarded 
benefits where the agency failed to bring forth contradictory medical evidence 
despite a second hearing following remand from the district court. The Court of 
Appeals "found it necessary to 'bring the charade to an end'" and awarded benefits to 
the claimant. Id. However, in Briscoe, the Court of Appeals emphasized that 
"obduracy" on the part of the ALJ is not in itself sufficient grounds for an award of 
benefits by a reviewing court. Id. 
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by establishing specialized courts,49 a similar division comes into play 
in the interpretation of the substantial evidence standard. The 
following cases illustrate the tension between an ideal of economic 
and judicial economy, which tends to afford maximum deference to 
the factual findings of ALJs, and an empathetic desire for meaningful 
review under the substantial evidence standard. 
This tension between economy and empathy in interpreting the 
"substantial evidence standard" is not new. It is evident in the Supreme 
Court of the United State's 1971 decision in Richardson v. Perales, in 
which the Court considered whether medical reports by physicians 
who have not been cross-examined, presenting evidence that 
contradicts live testimony favorable to the claimant, constitute 
substantial evidence supporting a finding adverse to the claimant.50 
Richard Perales challenged whether the unsworn, hearsay reports were 
constitutionally sufficient evidence.51 He claimed that because he had 
not had the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of these medical 
reports, these reports should not have been admitted as evidence.52 
Mr. Perales' presented evidence of his impairments in the form of 
testimony by one of his treating physicians and reports created by two 
others physicians who had personally examined him.53 Initially, Mr. 
Perales presented somewhat weak medical evidence that he was 
disabled due to a back injury.54 Mr. Perales had undergone back 
                                                 
49 For further critiques of the current system of review and a survey of 
proposed solutions, see Paul R. Verkuil & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative 
Approaches to Judicial Review of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 731 (2003). 
50 Richardson, 402 at 390. 
51 Richardson, 402 U.S. at 395, 398. Initially, Richardson challenged the use of 
unsworn reports as a violation of the Confrontation clause. The Court eventually 
addressed his claim as a procedural due process issue: "The question, then, is as to 
what procedural due process requires with respect to examining physician's reports 
in a social security disability claim hearing." Id. at 402. 
52 Id. at 395, 398. 
53 Id. at 395-96. 
54 See id. at 390-92. 
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surgery in an attempt to relieve his back pain.55 However, his surgeon, 
Dr. Munslow, was not able to definitively identify the source of his 
pain at surgery.56 Following the surgery, he diagnosed Perales' 
condition a "nerve root compression syndrome, left."57 His final 
diagnosis before discharging Perales was "neruitis, lumbar, mild."58 
Similarly, Dr. Lampert, a neurologist was unable to identify a 
neurological explanation for his pain.59 Following Dr. Lampert's 
diagnosis, Dr. Munslow recommended that Perales return to work.60 
Perales visited a third physician, a general practitioner named Dr. 
Morales.61 Dr. Morales hospitalized Perales for his back pain.62 He 
eventually diagnosed Mr. Perales with a moderately severe 
lumbosacral back sprain and with a possible ruptured disc.63  
After Mr. Perales applied for Social Security disability benefits, 
the agency ordered an additional medical examination by an 
orthopedic surgeon.64 The results undermined Mr. Perales' claim.65 The 
examiner concluded that although Mr. Perales did indeed have a back 
sprain, he was exaggerating his symptoms.66 The surgeon suggested 
that Mr. Perales had exacerbated his problems by failing to exercise.67 
He also suggested that there might be a psychological component to 
Mr. Perales' illness.68  
                                                 
55 Id. at 390-91. 







63 Id. at 392. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 393 n.3. 
67 Id. at 392. 
68 Id. at 393 n.3. 
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Mr. Perales' claim was denied and he requested reconsideration.69 
Dr. Morales submitted a report stating that Mr. Perales had never fully 
recovered from his prior back surgery, and that he was as badly off 
physically as he had been before the surgery.70 He believed that Mr. 
Perales was not malingering.71 He concluded that the injury was 
permanent and that Mr. Perales would not be able to continue working 
in his past line of work as a laborer.72 The state agency administering 
the DIB program also arranged for a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. 
Perales.73 Dr. James Bailey reported personality difficulties, but no 
separate psychiatric illness.74 After the agency denied Mr. Perales' 
claim a second time, he requesting a hearing before a hearing 
examiner.75 
Mr. Perales presented direct evidence of disability at his hearing: 
Dr. Morales testified as to the seriousness of Mr. Perales' condition, 
and Mr. Perales himself testified.76 The ALJ also admitted reports from 
Drs. Langton, Bailey, Mattson, Lampert, as well as the hospital 
records, over objections from Mr. Perales attorney, who objected to the 
hearsay nature of the evidence.77   
Dr. Morales' conclusions were contradicted by Dr. Lewis A. 
Leavitt, an independent "medical advisor" called by the hearing 
examiner.78 Based on his review of the medical reports, Dr. Leavitt 
testified that Mr. Perales' back problems were mild and were of 
musculo-ligamentous origin rather than the result a disc injury.79 He 
also testified that Mr. Perales' problems might in part be only 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Id. at 393. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 394. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 395. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 396. 
79 Id. 
10
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minimally psychological.80 Faced with conflicting evidence, the 
hearing examiner accepted the medical advisor's conclusions and 
denied Mr. Perales' claim based on that testimony.81 
Mr. Perales appealed to the Appeals Council.82 At this time he 
submitted an additional medical report which had been prepared to 
support a welfare claim.83 Although the examining physician, Dr. 
Williams, was unable to definitively identify the source of the pain, he 
concluded that Mr. Perales was 15% disabled at that time and could 
probably be reconditioned to return to work.84 The Appeals Council 
also denied Mr. Perales claim.85 Mr. Perales appealed in federal court, 
arguing that he had been denied procedural due process because the 
physician's reports on which the medical advisor relied were 
uncorroborated hearsay.86 He also argued that he had not had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the doctors who wrote the reports.87 
A Supreme Court majority upheld the use of medical reports 
without cross-examination over the protest of the dissent. These 
differing views regarding the constitutional adequacy of disability 
hearing procedures illustrate a subtle but persistent rift over what 
constitutes a fair determination by an ALJ in a Social Security 
disability hearing. The Court acknowledged that an ALJ's decision 
must be supported by "substantial evidence."88 The majority was 
satisfied with the probative value of the hearsay reports.89 The Court 
recognized several indicators reliability. First, the non adversarial 
nature of proceedings themselves give rise to a presumption of 
                                                 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 396-97. 




86 Id. at 397-98. 
87 Id. at 398. 
88 Id. at 401. 
89 Id. at 402. 
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impartiality.90 The agency is intended to act as an adjudicator of 
claims, not as an advocate or an adversary.91 Second, the majority saw 
no evidence of bias in the extensive medical reports.92 It believed the 
reports to be consistent.93 Further, the Court recognized a general 
societal acceptance of the probative nature of physicians' reports.94 
Third, with respect to cross-examination, the Court noted that Mr. 
Perales had not entirely availed himself of his statutory rights.95 Mr. 
Perales had failed to take advantage of a five-day period in which he 
could have requested subpoenas of the authors of those medical 
reports.96 Finally, the Court addressed an "additional and pragmatic 
factor which, although not controlling, deserves mention."97 The Court 
concluded that live testimony would be too great a drain on financial 
resources of the system, particularly where subpeonas had not been 
requested.98 Accordingly, the court held that Mr. Perales had not been 
denied the rights of confrontation and cross-examination.99  
 Taking all considerations into account, the Court was satisfied 
with the fundamental fairness of the system.100 The hearing process 
was consistent with due process rights for several reasons. First, the 
hearing did not concern a termination of benefits.101 Second, the 
majority did not believe that reliance on those reports had any adverse 
impact on the system's fundamental integrity and fairness because the 
                                                 
90 Id. at 403. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 404. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 405. 
95 See id. at 406-07. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 406. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 407-08. 
100 Id. at 410. 
101 Id. at 406-07. The court contrasted the application for disability benefits 
with the termination of AFDC benefits at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
254 (1970). 
12
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medical reports had probative value.102 Finally, the Court rejected the 
contention that the examiner had a dual role as a judge and an 
advocate, despite his obligation to develop the facts.103 According to 
the Court, requiring additional examination would harm a complex 
system that was working well.104 Despite the Court's assertion that cost 
was merely a pragmatic matter, and not controlling, the Court's 
concerns over the workability of a large and complex system loom 
large in the decision. 
The dissenting justices vehemently disputed whether medical 
reports as interpreted by a medical advisor should be considered 
"substantial evidence" sufficient to contradict live testimony from the 
claimant and from an examining physician.105 The dissent noted that 
one doctor, the 'medical advisor," had never seen the patient.106 
Additionally, doctors in this case had serious conflicts of interest—
some had been hired by the insurance company seeking to defeat Mr. 
Perales' workmen's compensation claims.107 The dissent also 
questioned whether a "circuit-riding doctor[]" hired by the agency 
itself to interpret medical records could be impartial.108 It blasted the 
majority decision as an injustice wreaked on an individual by a 
powerful bureaucracy.109 It characterized the "cutting of corners" as 
contrary to the spirit of the law and beneath the dignity of a great 
nation.110 Although the dissent lost on the issue of the admissibility of 
unsworn medical reports, this strong empathy for claimants entangled 
in administrative procedures survives as a major concern in the 
analysis of the substantial evidence standard. 
 
                                                 
102 Id. at 407-08. 
103 Id. at 410. 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 411-12 (Douglas, J. dissenting). 
106 Id. at 413. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 414. 
110 Id. 
13
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C. Substantial Evidence in the Seventh Circuit 
 
1. Smith v. Apfel 
 
In the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit the tension 
between efficiency and empathy played out in a struggle over the 
degree of deference accorded to the ALJ when reviewing adverse 
decisions under the substantive evidence standard. In Smith v. Apfel, 
Mr. Smith had been receiving Social Security disability payments for 
disability due to alcoholism.111 In 1997 the Social Security 
Administration changed the rules so that alcoholism was no longer a 
disability.112 The SSA informed Mr. Smith that unless he could show 
that alcoholism was not a contributing factor to his disability, his 
benefits would cease.113 Mr. Smith requested a review, claiming that 
he was unable to work because of arthritis, back pain, an ulcer, and 
cirrhosis of the liver.114 Records from Mr. Smith's treating physician of 
21 years confirmed some degenerative disease in his left knee and 
right ankle in X-rays taken in 1987.115 In 1996 a diagnosis of 
osteoarthritis was also recorded. Mr. Smith also was taking medication 
for hypertension.116 
Shortly after requesting review, Mr. Smith was examined by a 
consultative physician, Dr. Bharti.117 Dr. Bharti confirmed 
degenerative changes in Mr. Smith's right ankle but found no other 
problems.118 Although Mr. Smith claimed back pain when lifting 
anything over 50 pounds, Dr. Bharti noted that he had a full range of 
motion in his back.119 Based on Dr. Bharti's report, state agency 
                                                 
111 231 F.3d 433, 434 (7th Cir. 2000) 
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physician Dr. Dow determined that Mr. Smith had mild osteoarthritis 
and was probably suffering from degenerative joint disease in the 
lumbar area as well.120 She determined that Mr. Smith was able to 
work in a job that required lifting or carrying up to 50 pounds 
occasionally and 25 pounds frequently.121 A third physician, Dr. 
Baraglia, also assessed Mr. Smith's records.122 He concluded that Mr. 
Smith could lift no more than 20 pounds occasionally.123 He also 
determined that Mr. Smith could not stand or walk for an eight-hour 
work day, and could only occasionally climb, balance or stoop because 
of arthritis in his knees.124 Two months later, Dr. Baraglia amended his 
opinion, stating that Mr. Smith could not walk a block without severe 
pain and could lift no more than 10 pounds occasionally.125 He also 
stated that Mr. Smith had a limited range of motion in his back.126 
At his hearing, Mr. Smith testified to his limited ability to sit in 
one place or to stand for long periods of time. 127He also told the 
hearing administrator that he suffered from spells of dizziness due to 
his hypertension.128 He said that he could regularly lift 25 to 30 
pounds but that he had trouble with anything weighing more than 50 
pounds.129 In this respect, his testimony corresponded much more 
closely with the evaluation done by Dr. Bharti than with the report 
from Dr. Baraglia.  
Mr. Smith's case presents a combination of impairments with 
subjective elements, such as pain, and varying medical testimony. The 
ALJ in this case took issue with Mr. Smith's credibility, and 






125 Id. at 436. 
126 Id. 
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determined that Mr. Smith did not have pain related to arthritis.130 He 
faulted Dr. Bharti for failing to order X-rays that might support his 
medical opinion. He also did not consider Mr. Smith's claim of 
dizziness due to hypertension.131 After hearing the medical evidence 
and testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that Mr. 
Smith's skills were transferable to the position of forklift operator.132 
Mr. Smith appealed the decision as not being based on substantial 
evidence.133 
In her opinion for the majority, Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner, 
joined by Judge Ann Claire Williams, held that the ALJ's decision was 
not based on substantial evidence.134 The court concluded that it was 
impossible for the ALJ to evaluate Mr. Smith's arthritis without 
updated X-rays, despite the vocational expert's information that 
operating a forklift required frequent use of the right foot.135 The court 
also faulted the ALJ for failing to take Mr. Smith's spells of dizziness 
into account when determining that he was capable of operating a fork 
lift.136 The court reversed and remanded with instructions, 
emphasizing the ALJ's duty to develop a "full and fair record," and 
admonishing the ALJ not to simply select and discuss the evidence 
favorable to his position.137 
In his dissent, Judge Kenneth F. Ripple disagreed with the lack of 
deference given to the ALJ's findings, particularly to the ALJ's 
credibility determination.138 He emphasized that the ALJ is in the best 
position to make a credibility determination and to evaluate various 
discrepancies.139 According to the dissent, to overturn the credibility 
                                                 




134 Id. at 438. 
135 Id. at 437-38. 
136 Id. at 438. 
137 Id. at 437-38. 
138 Id. at 438-45 (Ripple, J. dissenting). 
139 Id. at 439. 
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determination, and all that followed, the claimant would have to show 
that the ALJ was "patently wrong" in his credibility determination.140 
With respect to the lack of recent X-rays, rather than taking the 
omission to indicate that the ALJ had failed to develop the record 
fully, the dissenter would have taken the absence of evidence as 
probative of the claimant's lack of credibility.141 In short, the dissent 
would have placed a higher burden on the claimant and a lesser burden 
on the ALJ and deferred almost entirely to the ALJ in credibility 
determinations. In a case where the ALJ considered multiple 
impairments, including a subjective evaluation of pain, the majority 
and the dissent emphasize distinct aspects of the ALJ's role, the 
investigative and the adjudicatory, as they massage the burden of the 
claimant and the level of deference to the ALJ under the substantial 
evidence standard. 
 
2. Sims v. Barnhart 
 
Social Security disability cases are highly fact-intensive, which 
can make comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, whether the court 
chooses to construe the responsibilities of claimants and administrative 
law judge more narrowly or more broadly depends on both the 
circumstances of the case and the sympathies of the panel hearing the 
appeal. In Sims v. Barnhart, a majority consisting of Judge Daniel A. 
Manion and Judge Frank H. Easterbrook held that a denial of benefits 
was based on substantial evidence despite the claimant's constellation 
of ailments and a vocational expert's opinion based on some highly 
questionable assumptions.142 The majority rejected Sims' claims that 
the ALJ had not taken into account each condition, considering the 
effect in combination, because the ALJ had mentioned each of these 
factors in the opinion.143 
                                                 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 443. 
142 309 F.3d 424, 432 (7th Cir. 2002). 
143 Id. at 432. 
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The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Sims had severely impaired renal 
function and hypertension.144 She had also been to the emergency 
room three times for fainting spells.145 A computed tomography 
("CT") scan revealed "generalized atrophy" and "focal areas of 
decreased attenuation" consistent with a history of lunar infarcts, small 
lesions on the brain caused by a lack of blood flow to the affected 
area.146 Ms. Sims also complained of headaches.147 She had a history 
of recurrent depression, panic disorder, and agoraphobia.148 Three 
Global Assessment of Functioning tests were performed; one showed 
that she would have "moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or 
school functioning," while two later showed "some difficulty."149 She 
also had a borderline IQ score.150 However, she was able to drive to do 
errands, care for herself at home and to attend church.151 The ALJ 
concluded that none of these impairments alone were of sufficient 
severity to meet the listed requirements.152 The ALJ questioned the 
credibility of Ms. Sims' allegations concerning the "intensity, 
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms," finding the 
allegations inconsistent with the record as a whole.153 As a result, the 
ALJ concluded that the combined effect of her impairments was also 
not severe enough to rise to the level of a disability.154 After hearing 
the advice of a vocational expert who concluded that sufficient jobs 
were available in the economy that she was capable of performing, the 
ALJ found her not to be disabled.155  
                                                 
144 Id. at 428. 
145 Id. at 426. 
146 Id. at 426  n.1. 
147 Id. at 427. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 427 at n.5 
150 Id. at 427. 
151 Id. at 428. 
152 Id.  
153 Id. at 431. 
154 Id. at 431. 
155 Id. at 428. 
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 The majority of the Seventh Circuit panel agreed, and held 
that Ms. Sims failed to show that the decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence.156 The decision hinges on deference. The 
majority did not discuss the ALJ's credibility determination except to 
note that it would not disturb a credibility finding unless it was 
patently wrong.157 Rather than reweighing the combined effect of 
Sims' impairments the majority noted that the ALJ had recognized her 
various complaints.158 The majority also considered itself persuaded 
that the decision was supported by substantial evidence because the 
ALJ had ensured that the vocational expert took the impairments into 
account when determining whether jobs existed in the economy that 
Sims could perform.159 Yet the majority concluded with a statement 
that casts doubt on its satisfaction with the ALJ's decision, "urg[ing] 
the SSA in the future to carefully examine the issue of disability in 
light of a claimant's total impairments."160 
In a strong dissent, Judge Richard Posner objected to how the ALJ 
had assessed Ms. Sims' various conditions.161 On the basis of her 
fainting fits alone, he argued, no employer would dare to hire her.162 
He ascribed Ms. Sims' failure to control her blood pressure with 
medication to her low intelligence rather than to willful 
noncompliance.163 Further, he heavily questioned the vocational 
expert's determination in several respects. The ALJ had failed to 
mention Ms. Sims' hypertension and fainting fits in his in his 
instructions to the vocational expert.164 The ALJ also told the expert to 
take into account her high-school education.165 However, Ms. Sims 
                                                 
156 Id. at 431. 
157 Id. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 432. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. (Posner, J. dissenting). 
162 Id. 
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had left school after the 8th grade and later earned a GED.166 The 
record contained no evidence of whether her series of strokes had 
impaired her mental abilities since.167 As to her ability to work, the 
dissenter considered her employment too sporadic to be considered 
substantial gainful employment.168 The resulting opinion from the 
vocational expert, Judge Posner argued, "rests on air."169 He concluded 
that the claimant was entitled to a competent examination of her 
disabilities but that she had not received it.170 Judge Posner scathingly 
highlights the injustice resulting from a position of extreme deference 
to the adjudicatory role of the ALJ. 
 
3. Carradine v. Barnhart 
 
In Carradine v. Barnhart, Judge Richard Posner, from a position 
in the majority, considered whether substantial evidence supported a 
denial of a disability claim where the claimant subjectively 
experienced severe pain but could offer no objective medical findings 
demonstrating the severity of the pain.171 Patty Carradine was injured 
in 1994 when she suffered a back injury as a result of a fall.172 The 
back injury caused severe pain and numbness in her right hand.173 In 
the course of her search for treatment with many doctors, she received 
a variety of diagnoses, including "degenerative disk disease, scoliosis, 
depression, fibromyalgia, and 'somatization disorder.'"174 
"Somatization disorder" refers to physical distress with a 
psychological origin.175  
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 432. 
169 Id. at 433. 
170 Id. 
171 360 F.3d 751 753 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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Although Ms. Carradine presented medical evidence of her 
underlying physical disorders, she could offer only testimonial 
evidence concerning the severity of her pain.176 She testified to pain so 
disabling that she could not work, and her husband corroborated her 
distress.177 The administrative law judge acknowledged that severe 
pain can be totally disabling but declined to find Ms. Carradine 
disabled.178 He did not believe that her pain was as severe as she had 
testified for several reasons. 
Two members of the three-person panel, Judge Posner and Judge 
Kenneth Ripple, agreed that the ALJ's decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence. This majority was willing to question the ALJ's 
credibility determination, ultimately holding that the ALJ's credibility 
determination was based on serious errors in reasoning rather than on 
Ms. Carradine's demeanor.179 Citing law from the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Judge 
Posner emphasized the difference between genuine pain with a 
psychological origin and exaggerated claims of pain.180 Where the 
existence of an underlying impairment is supported by objective 
medical evidence, an ALJ cannot dismiss claims of pain merely 
because the witness testifies to subjective symptoms.181 Pain with a 
psychological origin, according to Posner, is no less real because it can 
                                                 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id.  
179 Id. at 753-54. 
180 Id. at 754-55 (citing Metz v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995); 
Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir. 1994); Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 
1128, 1129 (8th Cir. 1989)). Indeed, the single Seventh Circuit decision cited by the 
majority that considered a somatic pain disorder, Cass v. Shalala, displays reasoning 
seemingly contrary to the majority's reasoning in Carradine.  See Cass v. Shalala, 8 
F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir. 1993). The Cass panel, consisting of Judges Flaum, 
Easterbrook and Kanne, unanimously affirmed a denial of benefits based in part on 
deference to the ALJ's finding that the applicant's claim of disabling pain was not 
credible. See Cass, 8 F.3d at 554-55. 
181 Carradine, 360 F.3d at 753. 
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be evaluated only subjectively.182 Judge Posner stated, "If pain is 
disabling, the fact that its source is purely psychological does not 
disentitle the applicant to benefits."183 Judge Posner carefully 
distinguishes between psychosomatic pain and exaggerated or 
fabricated claims of pain, the second set of which do not qualify an 
applicant for benefits.184 The majority accuses the ALJ of entirely 
misunderstanding this distinction.185 Somatoform disorders are indeed 
mentioned as disabling disorders in the Social Security regulations.186 
However, this appears to be the first time this distinction has been 
made in the Seventh Circuit. The majority voted to reverse and remand 
for further findings over the strong objections of Judge John Coffey, 
who argued in his dissent that the majority had run roughshod over 
longstanding principles of deference.187 
 
II. GENTLE V. BARNHART 
 
In Gentle v. Barnhart,188 the Seventh Circuit steers away from the 
harsh stance of the majority in Sims and the dissent in Carradine. The 
unanimous opinion, authored by Judge Posner, emphasizes the burden 
ALJs bear to thoroughly investigate the combined effect of various 
conditions which may not individually rise to the level of a disability, 
including conditions that can be evaluated only subjectively. Nicole 
Gentle suffered from spinal disk disease, but her impairment was 
pain.189 The pain was so severe it made it difficult for her to walk, sit, 
stand, bend or turn, or to lift more than 20 pounds.190 In addition, she 
                                                 
182 Id. at 754.  
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 753. 
185 Id. at 754. 
186 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.07 (2006) (criteria for somatoform 
disorders, i.e., "Physical symptoms for which there are no demonstrable organic 
findings or known physiological mechanisms.") 
187 Carradine, 360 F.3d at 756-58 (Coffey, J. dissenting). 
188 430 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2005). 
189 Id. at 866-67. 
190 Id. 
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suffered from a number of other conditions that, while not individually 
rising to the level of a disability under Social Security regulations, 
combined to aggravate her pain. She suffered from serious allergies.191 
She was a "slow learner" who had difficulty concentrating on complex 
tasks.192 She also suffered from depression and anxiety.193 Finally, she 
was obese, standing 5 feet 11 inches and weighing 275 pounds.194 
She had formerly worked as a supermarket delicatessen worker 
and a school lunchroom attendant.195 In 2001, she stopped working 
upon the birth of her second child.196 At the time of the hearing, she 
was a single mother, taking care of her eleven-month child at home 
and sending her four-year-old child to preschool.197 Yet the 
administrative law judge who heard her case found that she was 
capable of substantial gainful employment, in part because she was 
able to care for her children.198 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the ALJ to task for 
failing to consider the combined effect of Ms. Gentle's various 
conditions, noting that the effects of conditions must be considered 
even where the underlying condition is not severe enough to be 
considered a disability.199 According to Judge Posner, the social 
security disability program is not concerned with health per se, but 
with whether a person is capable of working.200 The court stressed that 
conditions must not be confused with disabilities, and that any 
aggravating health factor must be considered for its incremental effect 
on disability.201 According to the court, the ALJ failed to account for 
                                                 
191 Id. at 867. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 868. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 866. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 867. 
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how Ms. Gentle's obesity might interact with her spinal disc disease.202 
Similarly, the ALJ also failed to account for how her psychiatric 
problems could affect her ability to work, particularly in combination 
with her disc disease and her obesity.203 
The Seventh Circuit also strongly disagreed with how the ALJ had 
evaluated Ms. Gentle's work capabilities. The ALJ had overlooked her 
uncontroverted testimony that she performed her household tasks with 
difficulty.204 The opinion emphasized that the relevant question was 
not whether she could care for herself, but whether she could perform 
"full-time gainful employment."205 It emphasized that a finding of 
disability has more to do with the ability to obtain substantial gainful 
employment than with actual health and pointed out the great 
differences between the home environment and the labor market.206 
Even caring for an infant, a disabled person could find times to sit 
down and rest.207 However, a delicatessen worker could not miss a 
couple of days a week or take a two hour break every day and remain 
employed.208 
The court reversed unanimously and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with the opinion.209 Although the court did not 
instruct the ALJ to gather additional medical opinions to develop the 
record, the lack of information concerning the interaction of Ms. 
Gentle's various conditions would seem to mandate further 
development, particularly if the ALJ is inclined to deny benefits again 
after further consideration.  
The decision sends several signals to courts reviewing adverse 
decisions in Social Security Disability cases. First, the court is unlikely 
to be satisfied that a decision is supported by substantial evidence 
                                                 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 868-69. 
204 Id. at 868. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 867-68. 
208 Id. at 867. 
209 Id. at 869. 
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simply because an ALJ has listed all the factors she considered when 
making her decision, as in Sims v. Barnhart. Merely following the 
five-step process and writing up the results will not ensure that a 
decision will be upheld. The courts will question more closely whether 
the bridge between the evidence and the conclusion is a logical bridge, 
making level of deference afforded to the ALJ in Sims less and less 
common. 
Second, the court will review decisions including an element of 
subjective evaluation on the part of the ALJ, such as credibility 
determination, or findings on the combined effects of impairments, 
against the objective reality of a claimant's likely employability. The 
analysis will consider not only whether a person is physically and 
mentally capable of performing some low level of work, and whether 
there are jobs in the economy fitting that description, but also whether 
an employer would be likely to hire a person with the claimant's 
specific impairments.  
Finally, when an ALJ's otherwise well-supported opinion collides 
with the objective reality of employability, courts will continue to ask 
the ALJ to investigate further rather than deferring to the ALJ in his 
adjudicatory role. The investigation cannot be screened off from 
scrutiny by a simple application of procedure. 
 These trends are a subtle and appropriate adjustment to the 
application of the substantial evidence standard. Because disability is 
defined by employability rather than health, it is appropriate for 
reviewing courts to make these inquiries. The somewhat more 
empathetic analysis does not end deference. Extreme deference 
undermines the fairness of the system as a whole. Rather, the approach 
taken by the Seventh Circuit in Smith, Carradine and Gentle balances 
deference to the ALJ in her adjudicatory capacity with the need for 




Inquiries into whether a determination of non-eligibility for Social 
Security Disability Insurance benefits is supported by substantial 
evidence are fact-intensive. Because these complex factual patterns 
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provide ample grounds for distinguishing between cases on the basis 
of the facts, they tend to obscure the divide over the interpretation of 
the substantial evidence standard in the Seventh Circuit. However, the 
contrast in the outcomes in cases such as Sims v. Barnhart and Smith v. 
Apfel and the vociferous dissents in both cases illuminate the struggle. 
This divide is particularly striking where evaluation of the claim 
requires a subjective evaluation of ills suffered by the claimant, or 
where physicians have difficulty pinpointing the sources of those 
ailments. In these close cases, the degree of deference accorded to the 
administrative law judge's decision appears to vary with the guiding 
philosophy of the panelists. 
In Gentle v. Barnhart, the Seventh Circuit extended the 
empathetic strain of interpretation which closely examines the 
investigation done by the ALJ, rather than taking a position of extreme 
deference toward the ALJ in her adjudicatory role. This is not a radical 
departure from existing law, but a shift consistent with the language 
and purposes of the Social Security Act. This decision signals that 
while the court will not usurp the role of the administrative law judge, 
neither will it dilute the substantial evidence standard for the sake of 
economy or expediency. 
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